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PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL 
There are only two parties to this appeal, namely Pacific Bay 
Baking Company (hereinafter "Pacific Bay") who is the 
defendant/appellant and G & K Services, Inc. (hereinafter MG & K") 
the plaintiff/appellee. 
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III. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Pacific Bay's Appeal seeks to reverse the trial court's award 
of attorney's fees to 6 & E. That award was reduced to judgment 
and Pacific Bay pursued a motion to reconsider, which was denied by 
the trial court. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d). 
IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
G & K sued Pacific Bay for its failure to live up to its 
obligations under a contract it had with G & K Services for laundry 
services and linen supplies. Following trial of the matter the 
trial court awarded G & K a total judgment of $7,545.83. Of that 
amount $1,450.00 represented the trial court's award of attorney's 
fees to G & K as the prevailing party. Pacific Bay's appeal deals 
solely with the propriety of the trial court's attorney's fee 
award • 
G & K takes issue with Pacific Bay's statement of issues on 
appeal and therefore asserts below the following issues which it 
believes more accurately represent the issues presented by this 
appeal• 
A. ISSUES 
1. Was the trial court correct in declaring G & K the 
prevailing party and in applying a reasoned and flexible approach 
in the apportionment and award of attorney's fees? 
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2. Was the trial court correct in declaring that Pacific Bay 
was not the prevailing party by virtue of G & K's net judgment and 
because Pacific Bay did not file an offer of judgment, conceded to 
judgment of approximately $3,700.00 after the trial had begun, and 
otherwise required G & K to appear at trial prepared to litigate 
all of its claims including the amounts eventually conceded by 
Pacific Bay? 
3. Does the fact that Pacific Bay successfully defeated only 
one of G & K's claims at trial and was successful in limiting the 
damages awarded by the trial court on two other G & K claims 
entitle Pacific Bay to prevailing party status and an award of 
attorney's fees ? 
4. Was the trial court's constructive award of attorney's 
fees to Pacific Bay in reducing G & K's attorney's fees in the 
amount of $630.00 appropriate in light of the facts and the 
circumstances of the case? 
5. Were the trial court's findings of fact sufficient to 
support the award of fees to G & K and the determination that 
G & K was the prevailing party under an abuse of discretion 
standard of review? 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Since Pacific Bay does not challenge the language of the 
contract between G & K and Pacific Bay which provides for 
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attorney's fees, the standard of review for contract interpretation 
is not applicable. 
When reviewing an award of attorney's fees, this court should 
affirm the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of discretion. 
Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1198 (Utah 1993). Paul Mueller 
Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 
1982)("it is this court's policy to accord great deference to the 
discretionary conclusions of the trial court regarding attorney's 
fees); See also Ouinn v. Ouinn (In Re; OuinnU 830 P.2d 282, 285 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); Stacey Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 
1085 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
V. STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions or statutes which have 
application to the issues in this appeal. However, Rule 68 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (the offer of judgment rule) has 
application and will be referenced by G & K in this brief. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
G & K is a Utah Corporation which is in the business of 
providing textile and laundry services to business throughout the 
metropolitan Salt Lake area. Pacific Bay entered into a contract 
with G & K wherein G & K was obligated to provide Pacific Bay with 
uniforms, towels, floor mats and other linen supplies which Pacific 
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Bay used in its day to day business operations. Pacific Bay was in 
turn obligated under the contract to pay G & K for those services. 
A dispute between G & K and Pacific Bay regarding the payment 
terms and the status of Pacific Bay's account occurred in late 
1991. On February 2, 1992, G & K filed a complaint seeking to 
enforce the provisions of its contract with Pacific Bay and collect 
on what it believed were delinquent accounts. (R. 1-6).* Pacific 
Bay answered the complaint on March 18, 1992. (R. 10-11). On May 
27, 1992, G & K filed a certificate of readiness for trial (R. 12-
14) and trial was noticed and set for July 9, 1992. (R. 15). 
G & K appeared at trial ready to prosecute its case on July 
9, 1992, but Pacific Bay did not show. At that time the trial 
court awarded judgment in favor of G & K and the court's findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, as well as the judgment, were 
signed by the trial court on August 10, 1992. (R. 16-19, 39-40). 
On July 31st, Pacific Bay moved to strike the judgment and 
restore the case to the calendar. (R. 20-27). On September 14, 
1992, the trial court granted Pacific Bay's motion, but awarded 
costs and attorney's fees to G & K for Pacific Bay's failure to 
show at trial. (R. 50). 
1
 For purposes of clarity G & K will refer to citations to 
the record by using the form (R. ) and when citing to the 
transcript of the proceedings at trial will use the citation form 
(Trans. ). 
9 
The Third Circuit Court, the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings 
presiding, conducted a trial of the matter on November 2nd and 3rd, 
1993, with all parties attending-2 (R. 71-74). That trial 
resulted in G & K obtaining a net judgment of $6,095.83, which 
included interest. The trial court further awarded G & K $1,450.00 
in reasonable attorney's fees. (R. 152-153). 
Following the trial Pacific Bay moved for reconsideration on 
of the fees awarded G & K. (R. 75-92) This motion was denied (R. 
164-165) and Pacific Bay now appeals the trial court's ruling on 
attorney's fees. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal focuses solely on the trial court's award of 
attorney's fees to G & K as the prevailing party. G & K will 
therefore set forth only the facts which it believes are pertinent 
to the court's determination and award of attorney's fees to G & K. 
G & K entered into a written contract with Pacific Bay on 
April 12, 1988. A copy of that contract is attached as Exhibit A 
to this brief and was likewise attached to the complaint filed by 
G & K . (R. p. 5). The contract obligated G & K to provide linen 
services to Pacific Bay and Pacific Bay was in turn obligated to 
2
 G & K notes that it took almost two years, from the time it 
filed its complaint, for Pacific Bay to finally acknowledge that it 
owed G & K for services previously rendered. Only at trial did 
Pacific Bay acknowledge the debt owed and concede to judgment. 
(Trans. 228). 
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pay for those services. In December of 1991, G & K and Pacific Bay 
found themselves in a dispute regarding Pacific Bay's payment 
practices and the obligations of both parties under the written 
contract. Thereafter, the contract between G & K and Pacific Bay 
was terminated and on February 2, 1992, G & K filed suit in the 
Third Circuit Court, seeking to enforce the terms of its contract 
with Pacific Bay. (R. 1-6). 
Specifically, G & K sought payment for services rendered in 
October, November and December of 1991 and likewise sought payment 
for uniforms and other linen supplies not returned to G & K by 
Pacific Bay after the termination of their contract. (R. 2). 
G & K further sought interest, attorney's fees, and liquidated 
damages as provided for in their contract with Pacific Bay. 
(R. 2). Pacific Bay filed a pro se answer on March 18, 1992. 
(R. 10-11). In that answer Pacific Bay denied the validity of the 
contract between it and G & K and denied any agreement to pay 
attorney's fees and costs. (R. 10-11). Pacific Bay did, in its 
pro se answer, acknowledge owing G & K amounts which were past due, 
but alleged that they owed less than the amounts set forth in 
G & K's complaint. (R. 10-11). 
On June 10, 1992, the trial court sent notices to all parties 
concerned setting trial for the matter on July 9, 1992. (R. 15). 
On July 9, 1992, G & K arrived at court fully prepared and ready to 
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prosecute its claims against Pacific Bay. However, Pacific Bay did 
not appear at trial so the trial court entered judgment on behalf 
of G & K for all damages complained for in its complaint. (R. 16-19 
and 39-40). 
Pacific Bay was successful in setting aside the judgment and 
restoring the case to calendar (R. 20-27). However, Pacific Bay 
was required to pay G & K's fees and costs as a result. (R. 50). 
Pacific Bay thereafter filed a new answer to G & K's complaint, 
this time through counsel. (R. 51). In that answer Pacific Bay 
reversed its position from its previous answer and denied owing any 
amounts to G & K. (R. 2, paragraphs 4, 5). One day prior to 
trial, Pacific Bay also filed a trial brief with the court which 
again failed to acknowledge any amounts owing t o G & K . (R. 66-
69). 
The trial was commenced on November 2, 1993, before the 
Honorable Judge Michael Hutchings. (R. 71). Following G & K's 
opening statement, Pacific Bay presented its opening statement to 
the trial court and at that time, after the court questioned 
counsel for Pacific Bay on the October, November and December 
invoices, Pacific Bay conceded those amounts (R. 11-12) and G & K 
moved for judgment on those matters, which was granted by the 
court. (R. 13-15). 
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Howeverf at the time Pacific Bay stipulated to judgment on 
all of the October and November invoices and part of the December 
invoices, it nevertheless did not concede or acquiesce on the issue 
of interest on those amounts pursuant to the contract, nor did it 
concede to attorney's fees. Id. It also did not concede on 6 & K's 
claims for lost or unreturned linen supplies, liquidated damages, 
and for services rendered on December 23 and December 31. Id. 
G & K then presented its case and set forth evidence 
regarding Pacific Bay's payment history and G & K's efforts to keep 
Pacific Bay current with its obligations under the contract. (R. 
15-103) G & K further presented evidence regarding the 
circumstances surrounding the termination of the contract and how 
G & K arrived at the appreciated amounts prayed for in its 
complaint by virtue of the non-returned or lost linen supplies 
provided to Pacific Bay. (R. 15-103). Testimony was also produced 
by G & K regarding the obligations under the contract, including 
the issue of costs and attorney's fees. At the end of G & K's 
case, G & K proffered the amount of attorney's fees expended in the 
prosecution of its claims up through that time. (R. 103-105). 
Thereafter Pacific Bay presented its case in defense of the 
claims prosecuted by G & K. Pacific Bay presented evidence 
regarding its contentions that their contract with G & K which 
required net ten payment terms was actually modified by a course of 
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performance and dealing between the parties. Pacific Bay also 
presented evidence disputing the manner in which the depreciated 
amounts were calculated and specifically contested three groups of 
uniforms declared unreturned or lost by G & K which Pacific Bay 
believed had actually been returned. (R. 321-364). 
Closing arguments were then entertained by the trial court 
and Pacific Bay at that time proffered their attorney's fees as 
part of their argument that they were the prevailing party and were 
entitled to fees. (R. 371-372). 
At the conclusion of closing arguments the trial court 
entered its ruling. (R. 396). The court accepted Pacific Bay's 
course of performance defense and disallowed G & K's claim for 
liquidated damages by holding that G & K terminated the contract, 
not Pacific Bay.3 (R. 397-399). The court then, in addition to 
the conceded amounts, granted G & K's claim for amounts attributed 
to the lost or unreturned linen supplies it had provided Pacific 
3
 G & K believes the court erred in determining that G & K 
terminated the contract when G & K demanded payment from Pacific 
Bay for the October invoices on December 23rd. The court ruled 
that that demand was premature since Pacific Bay's payment was not 
due until the end of the month, based on the course of performance 
modification of the contract. (R. 397-399) Even assuming the 
correctness of the court's ruling on the course of performance and 
payment term issues the October invoices were nevertheless due 
during the first week of December and G & K's demand for such on 
December 23rd was therefore timely. G & K has chosen not to 
counterclaim on appeal the correctness of this ruling due to its 
concern over the wise and efficient use of judicial resources and 
the costs that would be associated with such an appeal. 
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Bay. The court, however, disagreed with G & K's calculation of 
that amount and reduced this claim by fifty percent. The court 
also ruled that Pacific Bay did not have to pay for the December 23 
and December 31 invoices since G & K had terminated the contract. 
(R. 399-400). G & K's claim for past due invoices was therefore 
reduced accordingly. 
With regard to G & K's claim of lost or unreturned items the 
trial court, however, did rule against Pacific Bay who had 
contended at trial that several pieces of linen attributable to 
three of Pacific Bay's employees were actually returned. The trial 
court accepted G & K's arguments that they were not returned and 
included those amounts in the award for lost and unreturned 
uniforms. (R. 187). The trial court also granted G & K's claim 
for 18% interest pursuant to the contract between the parties. (R. 
401). 
Thereafter the trial court entertained a lengthy discussion 
on the question of attorney's fees. The trial court determined 
that it had to make a decision as to who was the prevailing party. 
The trial court recognized that it ruled toward the defense on some 
issues (R. 401-402). However, the court found that after adding 
up the conceded amounts, and the additional amounts G & K recovered 
as a result of the trial, G & K was the prevailing party under the 
net judgment rule. (R. 402). 
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However, the trial court enumerated additional factors beyond 
the net judgment rule which supported its finding that G & K was 
the prevailing party. The trial court found it significant that no 
offer of judgment was made by Pacific Bay, and that they had 
vacated the entire judgment awarded G & K almost one and a half 
years previously when Pacific Bay failed to show at the first 
trial. (Trans. 402). The court further held that because of 
Pacific Bay's defense tactics, G & K was forced to come to trial, 
put on evidence and otherwise be fully prepared and ready to 
prosecute all its claims even though Pacific Bay conceded to a 
substantial award after trial had commenced. (R. 402). 
The trial court also recognized that the judgment rule was 
only a starting point in determining an award of attorney's fees 
(R. 407), and recognized the importance of looking at other issues 
in the case. (Trans. 407). The trial court noted that it was 
utilizing a flexible and reasonable approach in awarding of 
attorney's fees (R. 402), and was applying an apportionment type 
doctrine. (R. 403). In light of these factors and because the 
court did recognize that Pacific Bay prevailed on some issues at 
trial, the court then chose to reduce the attorney's fees proffered 
by G & K, which totaled $2,080.00 (R. 404), by $630.00, thus making 
the total award of attorney's fees to G & K $1,450.00. The court's 
total award to G & K, exclusive of the attorney's fees which are 
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the subject of this appeal, thus consisted of $3,790.02 conceded by 
Pacific Bay at trial (Trans, p. 228), $785.19 for unreturned or 
lost items including the contested White, Kilgore, and Miller 
amounts (Trans, p. 400; R. p. 152-153), $93.00 in costs, and 
$1,427.62 in interest pursuant to the contract. (Trans, p. 401; R. 
p. 152-153). 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court was correct in declaring G & K the prevailing 
party. In reaching this decision the court considered a host of 
factors in addition to the fact that G & K, apart from attorney's 
fees, obtained a judgment of $6,095.83. The court thought it 
important that Pacific Bay had chosen, for whatever reason, to 
protest all of the amounts and claims sought by G & K in its 
complaint and had failed to file and offer of judgment. The court 
further found it significant that Pacific Bay had set aside a 
previous judgment due to its failure to show up at trial and that 
at that time it again indicated its decision to contest the entire 
amount sought by G & K. 
Pacific Bay also cannot now claim to be the prevailing party 
by virtue of its position that they prevailed on every major 
contested issue at trial. Pacific Bay erroneously points to its 
stipulated judgment at the beginning of trial as evidence that G & 
K in fact did not prevail on those issues since they were 
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stipulated. However, such an argument ignores the defense tactics 
of Pacific Bay which forced G & K to expend time, effort, and 
attorney's fees preparing itself to present at trial evidence on 
every claim pled in its complaint, including the claims eventually 
conceded by Pacific Bay. Case law makes it clear that those 
stipulated amounts are amounts that should be included in a 
determination of who prevailed at trial even if those amounts had 
been conceded prior to trial, which they were not. 
Furthermore, the net judgment rule is not without force in 
Utah nor has the net judgment rule been discarded or disregarded. 
In fact, Utah courts recognize the net judgment rule as a starting 
point and one of the factors to be considered by courts as they 
determine awards of attorney's fees. The trial court made it clear 
that there were a host of other factors besides the net judgment 
rule upon which it relied in awarding attorney's fees to G & K. 
Pacific Bay's attack focusing on the net judgment rule ignores 
these other factors. 
Finally, Pacific Bay was constructively awarded attorney's 
fees when the trial court expressly reduced the attorney's fees 
sought by G & K in recognition of Pacific Bay's successful defense 
of some of the claims prosecuted by G & K at trial. There is no 
evidence in the record that the trial court reduced G & K's fees 
because they were unreasonable or unwarranted. 
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VIII. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
G & K WAS THE PREVAILING PARTY AND IS THEREFORE ENTITLED 
TO ATTORNEY'S FEES BY VIRTUE OF ITS CONTRACT WITH PACIFIC 
BAY. 
A. The trial court was correct in applying the net judgment 
rule as a starting point for determining who is the 
prevailing party at trial. 
The trial court correctly looked to the net judgment rule as 
a partial guide in making the determination at trial as to who was 
the prevailing party. Pacific Bay's brief on this issue makes much 
of the alleged mis favor the net judgment rule has supposedly 
encountered in Utah. However, the net judgment rule is valid and 
recognized by Utah courts. Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. v. Mehr, 
791 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that the net 
judgment rule is "a good starting point in making determinations of 
which party prevailed."); Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. 
Neale, 783 P.2d 554, 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In addition to the 
net judgment rule, however, Utah courts have specifically noted 
the need to employ a flexible and reasoned approach in deciding on 
a case by case basis who is actually the prevailing party. 
Occidental, 791 P.2d at p. 221; See also Mountain States, 783 P.2d 
at n. 7; Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992)(the court should consider the circumstances of the case and 
other additional factors in awarding fees). 
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The record at trial makes it clear that the trial court 
utilized the net judgment rule in reaching its decision. (Trans. 
402) . However, the court specifically went on to recognize several 
factors which it believed added additional support for its 
determination that G & K was the prevailing party. Id. The court 
noted that for tactical reasons Pacific Bay had chosen not to 
concede or stipulate to any of the amounts owed to G & K until 
after the trial had commenced. (Trans. 402). The court felt this 
significant because G & K was forced to come to trial, put on 
evidence and be prepared to fully prosecute all of its claims. 
(Trans. 402). The court further noted that Pacific Bay had to set 
aside a judgment that was entered on behalf of G & K due to Pacific 
Bay's failure to show up at the previous trial. Id. The court 
believed that Pacific Bay could have, at that time, conceded the 
amounts clearly owing, implying that such a tactic would have saved 
all parties concerned, including the court, the time, effort and 
expense which was otherwise incurred by G and K preparing to 
present evidence on those amounts.4 (Trans. 402). See also 
Highland Const. Co. v. Stephenson, 636 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 
1981) (An important factor in awarding fees is the fact that the 
4
 Illuminative of the trial court's reasoning is the fact 
that Pacific Bay's pro se answers acknowledged owing amounts to 
G & K (R. 10-11), a position later discarded by Pacific Bay until 
it had succeeded in dragging G & K to court where Pacific Bay 
finally conceded those amounts. 
20 
plaintiff was forced to maintain an action until the defendant made 
payment on the debt owed.) 
In recognizing the tactics employed by Pacific Bay, the trial 
court was presumably referring in part to statements made by 
counsel for Pacific Bay in closing arguments. The exchange between 
counsel for Pacific Bay and the trial court in this particular 
issue merits reproduction here in full. 
MR. DYKES: I disagree on the point that since we 
stipulated to judgment, we are therefore not allowed 
the fees. All we did was agree that there was an 
undisputed amount owing, and I think there is a world 
of difference between the two. The point was that we 
are here litigating the issues of the last two invoice-
-last two invoices. 
THE COURT: Of course I would just ask you why did you 
[not] agree to that earlier in the litigation? You 
made a motion to set aside a judgment that was 
rendered, why not, in essence, make a motion to say— 
move, in essence, to set aside part of the judgment, 
the part that is disputed, there is another part that 
isn't disputed. 
MR. DYKES: Well your honor perhaps we should have. 
THE COURT: Or you could have made an offer of 
judgment. 
MR. DYKES: We could have, and we did engage in 
settlement negotiations along the line of, we don't 
dispute "X" number of dollars, but we never could reach 
a resolution on that issue. It is a fact that we don't 
dispute those amounts, and we thought it would save 
time to simply go ahead and stipulate to them. 
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Sometimes we hate to give up issues too early because 
it deprives us of bargaining strength later on, and 
that might have been part of the impetus behind that, 
(Trans. 371-372)(emphasis added).5 
This statement by counsel for Pacific Bay clearly indicates 
some of the reasons why Pacific Bay chose not to stipulate or 
concede on some of the amounts owing until after opening arguments 
had occurred and the trial had commenced. Pacific Bay was simply 
using that as a bargaining position to force 6 & K to consider the 
expense and effort they would have to go through in order to try 
the case on the merits. It is furthermore clear that Pacific Bay 
was thinking of much more than saving the trial court and G & K 
trial time when it conceded to owing some of the claims brought by 
G & K. Following the concession in Pacific Bay's opening statement 
(Trans. 225) counsel for defendant indicated that part of the 
reason he was stipulating to these amounts was to posture Pacific 
Bay as the prevailing party at trial and to entitle it to fees. 
THE COURT: Okay. Sof you're disputing the two 
invoices and then the liquidated damages claim? 
MR. DYKES: Liquidated damages, that' s—that' s correct. 
And we would also# to the extent this becomes relevant 
at the end, dispute the request for attorney's fees, 
because it will be clear, I hope, after the 
5
 G & K asserts that Pacific Bay's failure to file and offer 
of judgment was an important factor in the trial court's eventual 
award of fees to G & K. For additional discussion on this point 
see G & K's discussion of the Sessions case on pages 35-36 of this 
brief. 
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presentation of evidence that G & K has not prevailed 
under the relief they seek, but in fact, all they are 
entitled to is the disputed—or rather, the undisputed 
portion of the invoices, and indeed, in those 
circumstances, it is Pacific Bay, not G & K, which 
would be the prevailing party and therefore entitled to 
fees. 
THE COURT: Have you made an offer of judgment in the 
case? 
MR. DYKES: Have not, your honor. We have tried to 
settle and it was unavailing. (Trans. 226). 
These citations to the transcript at trial make it clear the 
tactics Pacific Bay was utilizing in its defense of the case. 
Pacific Bay was clearly more interested in posturing itself on the 
issue of attorney's fees than in genuinely conceding the amounts 
owing that it knew, even when it filed its first pro se answer, 
were rightfully due to 6 & K. (R. 11). 
The trial court's reliance on these factors in reaching the 
conclusion that G & K was the prevailing party is further supported 
by case law. An award of attorney's fees is placed solely within 
the discretion of the trial court and that discretionary standard 
is the standard of review governing this case. Baldwin v. Burton, 
850 P.2d 1188, 1198 (Utah 1993); Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley 
Dairy Ass'n. , 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 1982); Stacev Properties v. 
Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Ouinn v. Ouinn (In 
Re: OuinnK 830 P.2d 282, 285 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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In the case of Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1200 (Utah 
1993), the Utah Supreme Court held that a factor to be included in 
evaluating attorney's fee awards is "the necessity of bringing an 
action to vindicate rights." See also Travner v. Cushinq, 688 P.2d 
856, 858 (Utah 1984). Here, plaintiff was forced to initiate a 
lawsuit to vindicate its rights under the contract and obtain 
monies that were past due and owing almost two years after Pacific 
Bay incurred those obligations. 
In short, Pacific Bay should not be allowed to profit from 
its creative posturing at trial, all of which was done at the 
expense of G & K. Counsel for G & K made this point clear at 
trial. 
MR. STEELE: With regard to attorney's fees, your 
honor, there is no offer of judgment, its never been 
filed in this case, and we had to come here, we were 
prepared to dis—to go after every penny, including the 
stipulated amount. I don't care what they offered in 
terms of settlement, your honor, we had to come here to 
trial to get what they stipulated to at the beginning. 
I wouldn't have accepted their offer, your honor, had 
I known they were going to turn around and hang a noose 
around my neck for $2,000 - plus worth of attorney's 
fees. (Trans. 382). 
B. The fact that Pacific Bay successfully defeated one 
of G & K's claims at trial and reduced other amounts 
claimed owing by G & K does not make Pacific Bay the 
prevailing party. 
Pacific Bay argued in its motion for reconsideration of 
attorney's fees before the circuit court and again here on appeal 
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that it prevailed all major issues ultimately tried at court. Such 
an argument is pure subterfuge and is characteristic of a fish 
story wherein the fish that was caught becomes bigger and bigger 
over time as the story is told and retold. "While a reduction in 
the amount claimed by a plaintiff may seem a moral and financial 
victory for defendant, it does not make the defendant the 
"prevailing party" in terms of attorney's fees." Brown v. 
Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
The facts pertinent to this issue are as follows. 6 & K was 
awarded judgment of over six thousand dollars at the end of trial, 
exclusive of the attorney's fees that were also awarded. (R. 152, 
153). G & K also appeared at trial, having gone through the 
expense and effort to fully prepare itself to present evidence to 
prosecute all of its claims as set forth in its complaint. (Trans. 
402). After trial had commenced and after G & K's opening 
statement where it set forth its intention to present evidence on 
each and every claim set forth in its complaint, Pacific Bay 
stipulated to owing over $3,790.00. (Trans. 228). Pacific Bay 
later acknowledged that it refrained from removing these matters 
from issue prior to trial because of its interest in preserving its 
bargaining strength later on. (Trans. 372). 
G & K was also awarded by the trial court, at the end of 
trial, interest in the amount of $1,427.62 pursuant to the terms of 
25 
the contract. (Trans. 401, R. 152). The court further found in 
favor of G & K on the depreciated amounts prayed for in its 
complaint, although the court did reduce that amount, based on 
Pacific Bay's arguments that G & K had improperly calculated the 
depreciated amount, based on the terms of the contract. (R. 152, 
Trans. 400). The court also, as part of this depreciated amount, 
made a specific finding that G & K was entitled to collect for the 
missing or lost shirts of White, Kilgore, and Miller. (Trans. 
400). 
At trial, Pacific Bay specifically disputed the amounts 
attributable to those employees and G & K successfully presented 
evidence to the contrary, which the trial court accepted in making 
its finding. (Trans. 358-59). Thus the court's finding on the 
depreciated amounts resulted in judgment for G & K for $785.19. 
The only claim of G & K's which the court did not grant relief for 
was the claim for liquidated damages.6 The court based its denial 
of this claim on Pacific Bay's defense that the contract was 
modified through the course and performance of the parties and that 
6
 G & K in its complaint sought all of the invoice amounts, 
including the December 23rd and 31st invoices, in one prayer for 
relief. (R. 1-2) G & K did not plead each invoice separately and 
instead sought relief for all invoices in a lump sum. Id. 
Therefore, Pacific Bay did not defeat two separate claims but 
instead was successful only in reducing this amount through its 
course of performance defense. 
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it was G & K who terminated the contract, not Pacific Bay. (Trans. 
399).7 
Pacific Bay, in spite of the fact that G & K came away from 
trial with a judgment of over six thousand dollars excepting 
attorney's fees, argues now that it was in fact the prevailing 
party. However, this argument is not in conformance with case law. 
In First Southwestern Financial v. Sessions, 239 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 6, 
8 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court referenced Highland 
Construction Company v. Stephenson, 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1981) in 
holding that "a party in whose favor an affirmative judgment is 
rendered, whether or not the judgment is for less than initially 
sought in the complaint, is a prevailing party within the meaning 
of a statute awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party." 
While Highland dealt with the mechanics lien statute and Sessions 
also dealt with a statute, the logic and reasoning behind the 
decision is nevertheless applicable to a contract action. 
Highland. 636 P.2d at 1038 (citing Stott v. Cervantes, 595 P.2d 563 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1979)). Much of the case law cited in Pacific 
Bay's brief which would appear contrary to this assertion involves 
cases where defendants were found to be the prevailing party by 
virtue of their success in prosecuting their counterclaims at 
7
 See supra n. 3. 
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trial.8 This is particularly accurate in the case of Elder v. 
Triax Co. . 740 P.2d 1320, 1321-22 (Utah 1987), where a 
counterclaimant was declared to be a prevailing party by virtue of 
its success in prosecuting its own counterclaims.9 
Such is not the case here. Pacific Bay asserted no 
counterclaims and sought no damages from G & K. While Pacific Bay 
was successful in some of its arguments in limiting some of the 
damages G & K sought, such a scenario nevertheless does not entitle 
Pacific Bay to claim that they are the prevailing party. 
In Sessions, 239 Ut. Adv. Rpts. at 8f the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that just because a defendant is successful in limiting 
the amounts a plaintiff seeks at trial does not make that defendant 
a prevailing party. See also Brown, 840 P.2d at 155; Highland, 636 
P.2d at 1038; Underwriters at Llovds v. N. Am. Van Lines. 829 P.2d 
978, 981 (Ok. 1992)(even though a defendant is successful in 
limiting a plaintiffs damages, when that success does not result in 
a judgment for the defendant, the defendant cannot be considered a 
prevailing party); Blumenshine v. Battiste, 869 P.2d 470, 474 (Ala. 
8
 Pacific Bay relies heavily on the case of Marissi v. Lau, 
859 P.2d 605 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1993) in support of this argument. 
However in Marissi the defendant counterclaimed and both parties 
received money judgments. Id. at 606. Thus the party with the 
smaller award of attorney's fees was given an offset against the 
fees it owed the opposing party. Id. at 608. 
9
 See argument supra pgs. 30-36. 
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1994)(even though plaintiff did not prevail on every issue in the 
case, he succeeded on recovering significant award on the main 
issues and was therefore entitled to prevailing party status). Id. 
Such is the case here. While Pacific Bay did successfully 
defeat one claim asserted by G & K and reduced the amount of 
damages 6 & K was entitled to in two other claims, G & K 
nevertheless prevailed at trial on the October, November, and half 
of the December invoice amounts. G & K further obtained its 
contractual interest rate, bringing its judgment, exclusive of 
attorney's fees to over six thousand dollars. 
Furthermore, Pacific Bay would have this court believe that 
since conceding at the beginning of trial to almost four thousand 
dollars worth of G & K's claims removed those issues from trial, 
Pacific Bay can now characterize itself as having "fully prevailed 
on the major contested claim at trial . . . ". (Brief of Pacific 
Bay, page 13). Such an argument culls the record in its attempt to 
inaccurately set forth Pacific Bay as the real victor. While it is 
true that some of the time spent at trial dealt with issues which 
Pacific Bay, in part, was successful in defeating, that fact is 
largely the result of Pacific Bay's posturing at trial. Pacific 
Bay has failed to point to any case law which indicates that 
prevailing party status hinges on how much time at trial or how 
many pages of trial transcript can be allocated to the successes of 
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each party.10 In the case of In re: Marriage of Waters, 782 P.2d 
1220 (Col. Ct. App. 1989) the Colorado Court of Appeals set forth 
language which is very illustrative of this point. 
To be a prevailing party for the purpose of an award of 
attorney's fees pursuant to a statute or contract, the 
applicant must have succeeded upon a significant issue 
presented by the litigation and must have achieved some 
of the benefits that he sought in the lawsuit. But, a 
party need not prevail upon the "central" issue only 
upon a significant one. 
Id. at 1221, 1222. (emphasis added). 
In short, G & K obtained a significant judgment from its 
efforts at trial and prevailed on significant issues therein as 
well. Just because G & K did not prevail on every issue and may 
not have even prevailed on the central issue, which encompassed the 
majority of the time at trial (liquidated damages) does not mean 
Pacific Bay was the prevailing party.11 
10
 On page 11 of Pacific Bay's brief, Pacific Bay argues that 
much of the transcript at trial and consequently the time spent at 
trial dealt with issues upon which Pacific Bay prevailed. Pacific 
Bay even refers to the number of transcript pages which it 
attributes to its successes at trial by its own account, in the 
body of its brief, and references the same in footnote #4 of its 
brief. G & K asserts that this argument is irrelevant and not 
supported by case law. 
11
 Without being redundant, G & K notes that the amount of 
time spent at trial, on issues other than the invoices which were 
stipulated to by Pacific Bay, was not the result of G & K's 
pleading or Pacific Bay's meritorious arguments, but was instead 
solely the result of Pacific Bay's posturing before and at the 
beginning of trial. It goes without saying that this posturing 
resulted in additional legal expense for G & K, given the fact that 
Pacific Bay in its original pro se answer admitted owing the 
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C. The trial court made significant and adequate findings of 
fact supporting its award of attorney's fees to G & K. 
G & K acknowledges M[t]hat trial courts should make findings 
which explain the factors they consider relevant in making an 
attorney fee award, especially when they reduce the amount from 
that requested. Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 
P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 1982); Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 220 (Utah 
App. 1990); See also Brown, 840 P.2d at 155-56. 
Pacific Bay attacks the findings of fact made by the trial 
court in reaching its decision awarding attorney's fees to 6 & K, 
However, perusal of the transcript at trial indicates that the 
trial court made significant findings of fact in reaching its 
decision. In fact, the majority of the trial court's ruling and 
the discussion thereon revolved around the issue of attorney's 
fees, saving the remaining issues of liquidated damages, interest, 
lost or unreturned uniforms, and the two December invoices, minimal 
comment. 
Pacific Bay relies heavily on several cases led by the case 
of Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551 (Utah 
amounts eventually conceded at trial, amounts which it later denied 
owing in its second answer following Pacific Bay's successful 
motion to set aside the judgment for its own failure to attend the 
original trial. From the time of its answer forward, Pacific Bay 
did not concede 
owing amounts to G & K and forced G & K to assume it had to 
prosecute those claims at trial, which it was prepared to do. 
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App. 1989) in support of its argument that a litigant is entitled 
to an award of attorney's fees on only those issues which it has 
resolved in its favor at trial. Pacific Bay further argues that 
Mountain States stands for the corollary that a defendant to a case 
is also entitled to fees for areas in which it successfully 
prevails on at trial. (Pacific Bay's brief, page 23 and 24). 
Pacific Bay cites to several other cases which they argue on 
support to this proposition. See p. 23, footnote 8 of Pacific 
Bay's brief citing Trayner v. Cushinq, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984); 
Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279, 1288 
(Utah 1982); Stubbs v. Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168, 171 (Utah 1977); 
Stacev Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Utah App. 1989); 
Graco Fishing & Rental Tools. Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 
766 P.2d 1074, 1079-80 (Utah 1988). 
However, almost all these cases are distinguishable on the 
grounds that the defendants, arguing as Pacific Bay does here, that 
they were entitled to fees had counterclaimed against the 
plaintiffs and had prevailed in part at trial on those 
counterclaims and received money judgments. 
Such occurred in Mountain States where the defendant 
counterclaimed, but both parties obtained some monetary relief. 
Mountain States, 783 P.2d at 551. In that context the court 
applied the net judgment rule. Id. at 557. The same occurred in 
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Stubbs, where the defendant counterclaimed and both parties 
received some monetary relief, Stubbs, 567 P.2d at 168. In 
Trayner, the defendant counterclaimed as well, and both parties 
were awarded a money judgment. The defendant in Trayner, however, 
recovered less money than did plaintiff and thus the amount the 
defendant owed to plaintiff was offset by the amount of its 
recovery. Trayner, 688 P.2d at 856-57. In Paul Mueller, the 
defendant again asserted a counterclaim. Paul Mueller Co., 657 
P.2d at 1286. The entire holding by the Mueller court regarding 
attorney's fees focused on the amount, not the fact that one party 
was entitled to attorney's fees and further, focused on the fact 
that a counterclaim was present, and the defendant had been 
unsuccessful in prosecuting that counterclaim. Id. at 1288. 
Stacey Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080 (Utah App. 1988) is 
likewise distinguishable on these grounds. In Stacey, the 
defendant counterclaimed and was given an offset based on the 
success of some of its successful counterclaims. Id. 
Finally, the Graco case, while not involving a counterclaim 
on the part of defendant, nevertheless is distinguishable on other 
grounds. In Graco, the issue was not whether or not the plaintiff 
was entitled to attorney's fees, but instead, whether or not the 
amount of attorney's fees awarded to plaintiff was reasonable. 
Graco, 766 P.2d at 1080. The defendant in Graco was not entitled 
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to an award of attorney's fees even though it successfully defeated 
some of plaintiff's claims. Instead, the defendant in Graco sought 
to reduce the amount of attorney's fees awarded to the plaintiff. 
At trial and in this appeal Pacific Bay instead not only 
argues that G & K was not entitled to any fees (Pacific Bay brief 
pgs. 14, 24; Trans, p. 226, 382; R. p. 84) but further argues that 
Pacific Bay is actually the party entitled to the fees. However, 
none of the case law cited by Pacific Bay on page 23 of their brief 
allows for such an occurrence. The case most on point, i. e., one 
that does not involve a counterclaim, is Graco. The Graco court 
remanded to the trial court for an appropriate determination as to 
the award of attorney's fees and required the trial court to 
consider the successes defendant obtained at trial in determining 
the amount of fees awarded to the prevailing party. Graco 766 P.2d 
at 1080. In this case, the trial court made precisely those kinds 
of findings. The trial court reduced G & K's attorney's fee award 
in the amount of $630.00 (Trans, p. 404), not because G & K's fees 
were not reasonably incurred in the prosecution of its action but 
because Pacific Bay successfully defeated one of G & K's claims at 
trial and successfully reduced some of the damages G & K was 
claiming on other items. The court's language warrants citation in 
full. 
THE COURT: Okay. But following that flexible and 
reasonable approach, I'm granting attorney's fees for 
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the plaintiff; however, in light of the fact that the 
defense prevailed on some of the issues, the plaintiff 
will not get full attorney's fees, I'm going to reduce 
some of the attorney's fees in the case. You might 
call an apportionment-type document—doctrine, which, 
frankly, I subscribe to. I think its, in the case like 
this, is fair, it's flexible, and it is my hope that it 
is viewed to be reasonable, but that's what the court 
would do in this case. (Trans. 403). 
While the court made no specific finding at how it arrived at 
this number other than it was doing so on the basis of Pacific 
Bay's partial success at trial, simple math, based on the facts 
contained in the record indicate that the amount the court reduced 
6 & K's fees constitutes an amount much more than the amount of 
attorney's fees G & K incurred in the actual trial of the matter.12 
The trial court specifically referred to Pacific Bay's 
failure to file an offer of judgment as an awardable found fact, 
mitigating in favor of an award of fees to 6 & K. (Trans. 371-
372) (See Supra 17) In First Southwestern Financial v. Sessions, 239 
Utah Adv. Rpt. 6, 8 (Utah 1994) the Utah Supreme Court considered 
the failure of Sessions to timely file an offer of judgment on Rule 
12
 In G & K's proffer of attorney's fees, G & K presented 
evidence that it expended 2.5 hours in attorney's fees at the rate 
of $70.00 per hour on the first day of trial, and spent and 
additional 2.5 hours on the second day of trial for a total of 
$350.00. (Trans, p. 318). This constitutes a little more than 
half of the $630.00 reduction of G & K's fees ordered by the trial 
court judge. (Trans. 318). One can assume that the remaining 
portion of the reduction is attributable to G & K's pre-trial 
preparation on the liquidated damage claim which was the only claim 
Pacific Bay was successful in dismissing in its entirety. 
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68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as a factor that mitigated 
in favor of awarding attorney's fees to other litigant. The fact 
that attorney's fees were awarded pursuant to a statute in the 
Sessions case is not an important factor upon which Sessions could 
be distinguished given the fact that Utah Courts have made no real 
distinctions between attorneys fees provided by statute and those 
provided by contract when both appear to be mandatory. See Warner 
v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Harrington 
Const. Co. v. Stephenson, 636 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1981). 
If this court accepts the trial court's and Pacific Bay's 
contention that it was entitled to recognition for the time G & K 
spent at trial on issues on which it did not prevail, then Pacific 
Bay has been compensated for almost twice that amount by virtue of 
the court's $630.00 offset of G & K's fees. 
Since the trial court clearly made findings of fact 
purporting its decision to award plaintiff attorney's fees and 
declare G & K the prevailing party (Trans. 402) and since this 
court should give great deference to the discretionary conclusions 
of the trial court regarding the award of attorney's fees, Paul 
Mueller, 657 P.2d at 1287, Pacific Bay's contentions that the court 
erred in making significant findings of fact is without merit. 
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POINT II 
G & K IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD THIS 
COURT RESOLVE THIS APPEAL IN G & K'S FAVOR, 
The law is clear that "a provision for payment of attorney's 
fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred by the 
prevailing party on appeal as well as trial." Rosenlof v. 
Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372, 376 (Utah 1983); Management Services Corp. 
v. Development Associates. 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980) (See also 
Schuhman v. Green River Motel, 835 P.2d 992, 998 (Utah App. 1992). 
Should G & K prevail here on appeal, G & K respectfully 
requests this court to remand to the trial court for an appropriate 
award and determination of fees incurred by G & K in response to 
Pacific Bay's appeal. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
G & K requests this court to deny Pacific Bay's appeal and 
affirm the trial court's ruling on the attorney's fee issue. 
G & K further requests that this court remand this case to the 
trial court with an order that the trial court make an appropriate 
award of attorney's fees to G & K for the time and costs incurred 
in responding to Pacific Bay's Appeal. 
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ADDENDUM 
Tab A 
Textile Leasing Systems i&iR u m 13624 
10039-01 
THIS IS AN AGREEMENT between 
SERVICE AGREEMENT 
Pacicif Say Baking ("Customer") and G&K SERVICES, INC. 
("Supplier") for the service described herein on the terms and conditions stated below and on the reverse side as though fully set forth on this side: 
1. Agreement to Supply. Supplier agrees to supply and Customer agrees to accept exclusively from Supplier, during the term of this Agree-
ment and any extensions or renewals hereof, all of Customer's requirements for the types of .merchandise, equipment and services listed below at the 
prices there stated. If Customer requests additional amounts or types of merchandise, equipment or services, such additional merchandise,, equip-
ment or services will be covered by this Agreement and will be subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein. 
2. Prices. The pnces and pricing method for items listed are stated below. Minimum or flat rate charges are based upon total inventory in-
stalled and are subject to change if inventory increases or decreases. However, a decrease in the number of Customer's employees will not decrease 
the weekly service charge unless an employee terminates his employment and Customer returns the full number of garments issued to him. 
ITEM DESCRIPTION 
I S h i r t s 
I P a n t s 
C o v e r a l l s 
L i n e d J a c k e t 
Shop Towls 
T e r r v / R i b T o w e l s 
4 2 " M O D 
G r i l l Pad 
3 6 " Mop 
3 x 4 Mat 
4 x 6 Mat 
[ M i t t 
Charges will be made lorcprep^ 
J TOTAL
 r WJ, J 
NUMBER 
OFPERSONS 
rational additional o 
rices are based on 52 
CHANGES: 
PER WEEK • 
tiers,-; names^emblei 
weeks per yearSeni 
t 
WEEKLY CHARGE? 
fcER*CHANGE_ i 
. S O 
- t > 0 
l.lO 
£.z* 
-o7 
.11 
MS 
fOfa 
/•lO 
j-so 
<c/.iS 
< 
1 *7 -> 
nsiandtseasonal%ri'ari 
WEE^LYMR'GE 
cjetn/erS? 
3. Supplier's Guarantee. Supplier guarantees that it will: 
a. Repair and return to Customer, on the next scheduled delivery day, all garments in need of repair; 
b. Return all merchandise in a useable condition; 
c. Return all merchandise picked up for cleaning the following scheduled delivery day; and 
d. Deliver in one week all addmen requesting standard size and color received on a regular delivery day. 
If Supplier fails to meet the guarantees listed above, Customer will be entitled to a credit equal to the weekly charge for the non-conforming item. 
Supplier's failure to meet the above guarantees will not entitle Customer to cancel this Agreement. 
4. Effective Date. This Agreement takes effect as of the date of signing. For new Customers of Supplier, the estimated date of first installation is 
, 19 
5. Price Increases. If Supplier's costs of rendering services increase during the term of this Agreement or any renewal hereof, the prices of the 
services may be revised. Supplier will give Customer notice of such price changes by invoice or by statement or other written notice. Customer agrees 
to accept such price changes so long as the changes do not represent an increase of more than 10% in the price of services being provided for any one 
year period. If such price increases do exceed 10% in any one year period and Customer decides not to accept the change, Customer agrees to so notify 
Supplier. If Customer so notifies Supplier, Supplier may, at its sole option, either adjust the price increase or cancel this Agreement. 
THE UNDERSIGNED CUSTOMER UNDERSTANDS AND ACCEPTS THE TERMS OF THE SERVICE AGREEMENT PRINTED ABOVE AND ON THE REVERSE. 
Pacific Bay Baking 
535 West 800 South 
Woodcross 
Date 
 S ICE Gf 
.Zip C o d e - 8 4 0 8 2 . 
G & K Services 
Salesman's Signature^ 
Accepted By 
\ttest 
I J ^ CO^T^K<<-
w. <2>u^- ~7rfGsu»^<—-
OFFICE COPY 
crkdQ 
..Payment of Charges. Charges will be due and payable in cash at time oudelivery, or, if Customers credit is app-
i Jc~nh £ay of the month following delivery Delinquent accounts are'subjects'automatic; Cash On Delivery basis MFamowts*npf 
-doe" toilrbe subject to a service charge to be added thereto of one and one-half percent (11/2%)"per month (18% annuity) until p&id 1 when-c 
Term of Agreement. This Agreement will continue until a date thirty-six (36) months from the date of f i r s r i s t S l l a t i o n ^ f c S ^ ^ ^ 1 
Customers) or the date Customer signs a renewal contract (f6TJrenewal 'Customers) (the "Expiration Date*) It will then be reneweo^utomaticallyto-^ 
for a penod of one year unless written notice of non-renewal is given by either party to the other at least sixty (60) days prior to the Expiration Date ^ 
Subsequent renewal will occur automatically on a yearly basis unless sixty (60) days wntten notice of non-renewal is given prior to-any anniversary , 
oEthe Expiration Date ' 
8 Title to Merchandise. All merchandise and equipment provided to Customer under this Agreement will, remain the property of 
Supplier Customer must return all merchandise when soiled to Supplier and may not permit any other person \o clean or launder it Customer 
will be required to pay the depreciated value of all merchandise or equipment lost or damaged beyond repair (ordinary wear and tear excepted) 
during the course of the agreement or not returned to Supplier at termination of the Agreement 
9 Depreciated Value. Depreciated value for the purpose of this Agreement will be determined by deducting from Supplier's original 
list price four percent (4%) per month down to a minimum of fifty percent (50%) of list price 
10 Specially-Purchased Merchandise. If Customer breaches this Agreement or gives notice of its termination Customer agrees 
to buy, upon demand of Supplier, all of the following specially-purchased merchandise in service or held in stock by Supplier under this 
Agreement at a price equal to its depreciated value as defined above Customer must pay for such merchandise within thirty (30) days of 
Suppliers demand 
ITEM DESCRIPTION NUMBER OF PERSONS CHANGES PER WEEK TOTAL INVENTORY ] 
11 Interruptions of Service. Supplier will not be liable for any interruption of Supplier's usual operations, or for delay, postpone-
ment or termination of the service'provided for in this Agreement by reason of acts of God, stnkes, lockouts, or other industnal disturbances, 
wars, blockages, riots, arrests, explosions, fires, floods, accidents to machinery or any other cause not within the control of Supplier 
12 Customer Warranty. Customer warrants that it is not presently under contract with any other party for the furnishing of the 
items of services which are the subject matter of this Agreement, and that this Agreement will not constitute or result in the breach of 
any contractual relationships to which Customer is a party or by which it is bound 
13 Liquidated Damages Upon Breach. The parties recognize and agree that if Customer should breach this Agreement or terminate 
this Agreement for any reason other than expressly permitted hereunder, the damages suffered by Supplier are not currently known or 
ascertainable Therefore, the parties agree that in the event of such breach or wrongful termination, Customer will pay to Supplier as liquidated damages, 
and not as a penalty, an amount equal to forty percent (40%) of the average weekly amounts invoiced to Customer multiplied by the number of weeks 
remaining in the term of the Agreement, beginning with the date of breach Such payments will be in addition to all other amounts owed by Customer 
to Supplier hereunder on the date of breach or wrongful termination 
14 Change in Customer's Location. Supplier's obligation to serve and Customers obligation to accept service will continue even 
if Customer moves its business to a different location, provided that the new location is within Suppliers route delivery area If Customer 
does business at more than one location, the items required at each location will be delivered to each such location Customer may not 
use any items delivered to one location at any other location 
15 Costs and Attorney's Fees. Customer agrees to pay Supplier any costs of collection incurred by Supplier in enforcing Customer's 
obligations under this Agreement If Supplier must institute a legal proceeding to collect any amount owing hereunder then the unsuccessful 
party in such legal proceeding must pay to the successful party its reasonable attorneys fees 
16 No Warranty With Respect to Merchandise CUSTOMER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE GARMENTS RENTED UNDER THIS 
AGREEMENT ARE FOR GENERAL PURPOSES AND ARE NOT DESIGNED OR RECOMMENDED FOR AREAS OF FLAMMABILITY OR 
WHEN CONTACT WITH HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OR IGNITION SOURCES IS POSSIBLE SUPPLIER IS NOT THE MAKER OF THESE 
GARMENTS AND HAS NOT MADE AND DOES NOT MAKE ANY REPRESENTATION, WARRANTY OR COVENANT EXPRESS OR IMPLIED 
WITH RESPECT TO THE MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE QUALITY SAFETY OR SUITABILITY OF THE 
GARMENTS FOR CUSTOMER USE, EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF THIS AGREEMENT 
17 Binding Agreement. This Agreement will be binding on and for the benefit of the personal representative successors and 
assigns of the parties hereto 
18 Severability If any provision of this Agreement is determined to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remaining terms 
and conditions will remain in full force and effect 
19 Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement and includes all understandings between the parties No waivers or 
statements made by any representative of Supplier will be valid unless contained herein 
20 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS . 
